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Abstract: In this paper, we shed some light on the mutual interplay of economic policy 
and the financial stability objective. We contribute to the intense discussion regarding 
the influence of fiscal and monetary policy measures on the real economy and the finan-
cial sector. We apply a factor-augmented vector autoregression model to Czech macroe-
conomic data and model the policy interactions in a data-rich environment. Our findings 
can be summarized in three main points: First, loose economic policies (especially 
monetary policy) may translate into a more stable financial sector, albeit only in the 
short term. In the medium term, an expansion-focused mix of monetary and fiscal poli-
cy may contribute to systemic risk accumulation, by substantially increasing credit 
dynamics and house prices. Second, we find that fiscal and monetary policy impact the 
financial sector in differential magnitudes and time horizons. And third, we confirm that 
systemic risk materialization might cause significant output losses and deterioration of 
public finances, trigger deflationary pressures, and increase the debt service ratio. Over-
all, our findings provide some empirical support for countercyclical fiscal and monetary 
policies. 
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Introduction 
Successful implementation of macroprudential policies requires, among other things, a 
good understanding of the interplay between economic policies, their respective targets, 
and financial sector development. In this context, there is an intense policy debate fo-
cused on determining the extent to which fiscal and monetary policy measures may 
influence the functioning of the financial sector (i.e. the financial cycle). This debate has 
generated interest in analysing the quantitative importance of policy transmission chan-
nels to the financial sector, their mutual coordination, and the implementation of macro-
prudential policy tools in smoothing the financial cycle.  
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In this paper, we contribute to that debate by presenting comprehensive time-series 
evidence on the fiscal-monetary-macroprudential policy interactions in a data-rich envi-
ronment. We differ from the rapidly expanding body of literature on monetary/fiscal 
policy and macroprudential policy interactions mainly in that we consider both policy 
shocks simultaneously and identify a specific policy mix that might increase systemic 
risk in the financial sector. Further, we also consider the kick-back effect of financial 
instability and analyze its propagation in the real economy. In the process, we aim to 
answer the following questions: First, does loose economic policy benefit financial 
stability? Second, do fiscal and monetary policy shocks impact the financial sector dif-
ferently? And third, how do financial imbalances influence real economic activity? The 
analysis is conducted for the Czech Republic, a small open economy that went through 
a transformation process from a centrally-planned to a market-based economy in the 
1990s. The selection of the country is purely pragmatic; the Czech Republic has a bank-
based financial sector dominated by foreign capital and ranks among the most open 
economies in Europe.  
After the Lehman crash, many of the pre-crisis claims, such as monetary policy’s ‘be-
nign neglect’ approach to asset price development or a strict division of labour between 
different policy levers, began to be questioned. Even the New Keynesian models, which 
implied that ceteris paribus price stability would be a sufficient condition for output to 
remain close to its natural level, were subject to criticism. Studies generally conclude 
(regarding the pre-crisis development) that the low-interest-rate environment in the pre-
crisis period led to the formation of financial imbalances while associated fiscal stimuli 
during credit booms only deepened systemic risk (see Taylor, 2009; Obstfeld and 
Rogoff, 2009, for policy discussion, or Adrian and Liang, 2016, for empirical analysis). 
The subsequent financial crisis then led to deflationary pressures and an unprecedented 
(apart from wartime) increase in public debt levels in developed countries.
3
 The in-
crease in sovereign default risk further lowered trust in deposit insurance systems and, 
in general, reduced the ability of fiscal policy to support economic growth. Therefore, it 
is only logical to question the role of economic policy in determining economic growth 
and maintaining financial stability.  
After the crisis, a new set of tools was introduced to reduce the procyclical character of 
economic policy. Its mandate is to prevent the accumulation of systemic risk and the 
formation of financial crises using prudentially-tuned measures of macroprudential 
policy. In the present day, it is becoming obvious that fiscal, monetary, and macropru-
dential policy affect each other and a strategic conflict may arise in certain situations. 
Therefore, Borio (2017) claims that counter-cyclical economic policy settings are now 
crucial, as global debt levels are at a historical high point and room for policy manoeu-
vring is remarkably narrow. In this context, achieving some form of coordination be-
tween economic policy and financial stability objectives seems to be a fundamental task. 
In fact, keeping the financial sector stable should be in the best interests of both mone-
tary and fiscal policy, given the excessive costs of financial instability.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 serves as a review of the 
literature published on the topic so far. Section 3 outlines the theoretical underpinnings 
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of the empirical framework applied and describes the data employed. Section 4 discuss-
es empirical results, and Section 5 concludes and describes some of the outstanding 
challenges. 
Literature review 
Monetary policy and financial stability 
A fierce debate on the interaction between economic policy and financial stability 
erupted after the most recent financial and economic crisis in 2007-2008 and to this 
point, a number of both theoretical and empirical studies were published. Attention was 
primarily given to the interplay of monetary policy and asset prices – a relationship that 
turned out to be crucial prior to the crisis. Kuttner (2013) provides an overview of the 
empirical findings both prior to and after the crisis. Current generally-accepted theory 
holds that one may expect asset prices to decrease following a contractionary monetary 
policy shock through the functioning of an asset-price channel. However, Galí and 
Gambetti (2015), using a time-varying framework, find protracted periods during which 
stock prices increase after a monetary tightening. On the other hand, Paul (2018) finds 
that stock prices always decrease following contractionary monetary policy shocks, 
while Aastveit et al. (2017) find that Fed episodically took real stock price growth into 
account. Still, stock price developments do not have a significant impact on monetary 
policy decision-making due to their higher volatility. In this area, housing prices are 
frequently discussed, as they are considered an early-warning indicator (Gramlich et al., 
2010, Babecky et al., 2013; Laina et al., 2015), and tended to increase sharply before the 
crisis. Therefore, many authors have argued for the inclusion of residential real estate 
prices in the consumer price index and the monetary policy decision-making process 
(e.g Goodhart 2001; Aydin and Volkan, 2011; Hampl and Havranek, 2017). They argue 
that this could lead to smoother business cycle fluctuations compared to conventional 
inflation targeting. 
In this context, there has been a renewed “lean or clean” debate aimed at verifying 
whether the central bank should incorporate asset price development into its decision-
making process, even when the current inflationary target is not at risk. Up until the 
crisis, monetary policy practitioners only responded to asset prices if and when associ-
ated risks actually materialized and were transmitted into the real economy (“clean up 
afterwards” strategy). Even today, this approach has its advocates. Svensson (2016) 
provides a comprehensive discussion and review of existing empirical studies and con-
cludes that “leaning against the wind” is still not fully justified. However, in light of 
recent empirical evidence showing that loose monetary policy influences asset prices, 
risk appetite, and financial stability in general, a growing number of studies favour the 
leaning against the wind strategy (see Smets, 2014, for a review). Those studies claim 
that monetary policy should respond to financial risk accumulation to forestall these 
risks’ materialization and the associated negative impact on the real economy (Filardo 
and Rungcharoenkitkul, 2016).  
Following this intense discussion, a consensus of sorts emerged in the form of a macro-
prudential policy toolset to complement existing capital and liquidity regulations. In 
many countries, macroprudential policy represents an autonomous branch of economic 
policy with its own objectives (financial stability) and tools. This new paradigm has 
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given rise to a new set of questions regarding the extent to which monetary policy is 
able to influence financial sector development, as well as the relative positions of mone-
tary and macroprudential policy, and their respective targets.  
In theory, the impact of monetary policy on financial stability is related to monetary 
policy transmission channels: the asset-price channel, the bank-lending channel, and the 
balance-sheet channel. Theory suggests that lower interest rates should strengthen fi-
nancial stability. Loose monetary policy is, under general circumstances, transmitted to 
lower lending rates (the bank-lending channel). Thus, loans become cheaper and more 
attractive, which then increases the volume of assets, the share of loans on total assets, 
and banks’ profitability. This also improves the balance sheets of economic subjects 
(the balance-sheet channel). Hoffman and Peersman (2017) also speak of a new channel 
of monetary policy that works through the debt service ratio, defined as total debt pay-
ments to the income of the private non-financial sector.  Hoffman and Peersman (2017) 
and Juselius et al. (2017) argue that monetary expansion leads to a decrease in the debt 
service ratio, with lower interest rates on the stock of debt outweighing a rise in the 
debt-to-income ratio. Drehmann and Juselius (2012) and Lombardi et al (2017) further 
state that changes in the debt service ratio can have aggregate macroeconomic effects 
and significantly influence financial stability.  
Also, one must not forget that keeping interest rates low in the long term may induce 
households and firms to gradually increase leverage through the conventional inter-
temporal substitution effect (for more detailed discussion see ESRB, 2016, and IMF, 
2015). Even commercial banks are influenced by the low interest rate environment, as 
to maintain their profitability, they need to change their portfolio structure in favour of 
riskier assets. Borio and Zhu (2012) describe this as the risk-taking channel of monetary 
policy. Recent empirical studies have already shed some light on its functioning (An-
geloni et al., 2014; Abbate and Thaler, 2015; Gilbert et al., 2018, to name a few). Borio 
(2014a) claims that accumulation of financial disequilibrium occurs most often during 
positive supply shocks, which push down prices while enhancing optimistic expecta-
tions and investment into riskier assets.  
Several studies stress the need for some form of policy coordination between monetary 
and macroprudential policy. The need for such coordination stems from the observation 
that monetary and macroprudential policy tools are not independent, as they affect both 
the monetary and credit conditions via their effect on credit growth (Malovana and Frait, 
2017). At the same time, the best economic outcomes can be expected if both policies 
are used in a complementary manner and are executed by a single institution (Libich, 
2017). Galati and Moessner (2013) provide an overview of research on monetary-
macroprudential policy interactions.  
Fiscal policy and financial stability 
During the recent financial crisis, extraordinary measures were taken, not only by cen-
tral banks but by governments as well, to prevent a collapse of the financial sector. 
Support packages from governments reached unprecedented levels and, despite the fact 
they might endanger fiscal deficits (Agnello and Sousa, 2009) and long-term debt sus-
tainability (Hallet and Lewis, 2008; Schuknecht et al., 2009), they are being justified by 
the idea that fiscal policy might be used to help economic recovery and, if executed 
properly, to foster financial stability. In this spirit, BIS (2016) claims that fiscal policy 
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should be, compared to the current state of affairs, much more countercyclical. Fiscal 
policy should therefore in times of financial boom generate a budgetary surplus and 
create sufficient fiscal space for subsequent financial cycle contraction.
4
 Governments 
however often use economic growth to increase mandatory expenditures or government 
investments, which, despite overall positive economic development, lead to a negative 
primary balance. Therefore, fiscal policy’s manoeuvring space may be substantially 
limited, especially due to ill-considered fiscal policy strategies during an economic 
boom. Still, to this day there is no unified view on the linkages between fiscal policy 
and asset prices. This is due to the fact that not all asset prices react alike to fiscal policy 
shocks (Agnello and Sousa, 2013), and that the fiscal and financial sector are inherently 
interlinked, making it hard to identify specific effects and their direction.  
To explain the interlinking in a more rigorous manner, let us consider the channels 
through which changes in sovereign risk may affect banks. One such channel works 
through the banks’ direct holding of sovereign debt (the asset holding channel). In gen-
eral, a financial boom often supports sovereign credit, which lowers the risk of sover-
eign default and improves banks’ portfolios. Also, banks often use sovereign securities 
as collateral to secure wholesale funding from central banks, private repo markets, and 
issuance of covered bonds, and to back OTC derivative positions. So, when the price of 
sovereign bonds increases, the value of the collateral automatically increases as well 
(the collateral channel). Ari (2016) shows that during a crisis, banks become heavily 
exposed to domestic sovereign bonds, which may lead to a rise in bank funding costs 
and the crowding out of bank lending to the private sector. Deev and Hodula (2016) add 
that in cases where government-owned banks directly participate in large governmental 
projects, banking fragility may result in the deterioration of state funds while also rais-
ing the risk of sovereign default. Also, one must not forget that sovereign ratings often 
represent a ceiling for the rating of domestic financial institutions, and thus any upgrade 
in a country’s rating also affects local banks (the ratings channel). These channels, 
when working in the positive direction during a financial boom, may greatly improve 
banks’ balance sheets and the availability of additional capital funding.  
During a financial cycle contraction, however, government debt usually grows because 
of a decrease in economic activity and asset prices. According to Borio et al. (2015), 
economic output is negatively influenced for many years after a crisis.
5
 During a finan-
cial crisis, asset prices significantly decrease and affect consumption and thereby indi-
rect taxes via wealth effects. The growth of non-performing loans and decline in asset 
prices can also undermine the health of private financial institutions. In such cases, the 
government may be forced to recapitalize such institutions from public funds (bail-out 
costs).
6
 There are also likely to be second-round effects on fiscal variables, particularly 
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BRRD). Their aim is to prevent the need for bank recapitalization from public funds and therefore 
to prevent a financial crisis having a one-time negative impact on fiscal sustainability. 
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when significant financial instability feeds back into the economy (for a more detailed 
description of transmission channels, see Eschenbach and Schuknecht, 2004).  
Fiscal-monetary-financial stability interactions 
Overall, the existing research on fiscal- and monetary-financial stability interactions 
may be grouped into two strands. One strand analyzes the effects of monetary and fiscal 
policies on the real economy and the financial sector separately, and abstracts from the 
interlinkages between individual economic policy measures. A review of such studies, 
although by no means exhaustive, was presented in the previous sub-sections. The sec-
ond, ever-expanding strand of literature analyzes the behaviour of economic agents in 
terms of interaction and exchange of information. Over time, it became crucial to ac-
count for the fact that both monetary and fiscal policy influence one another and interact 
with their broad set of instruments. This interaction and the (in)compatibility of their 
measures give rise to various impacts on the real economy and financial sector. It is 
reasonable to expect that none of the institutions involved will completely ignore the 
behaviour of other economic policy agents. The theoretical foundations of fiscal and 
monetary policy interactions are well established in the literature (Sargent and Wallance, 
1981; Leeper, 1991; Woodford, 1996, among others). Empirical attempts to analyze 
policy interactions may be found e.g. in Muscatelli et al.(2004), Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009), Rossi and Zubairy (2011) and recently in Bianchi and Ilut (2017) and Or-
phanides (2017). These studies adopt different approaches to the analysis, but the au-
thors generally agree that monetary and fiscal policies do not contradict themselves in 
the event of shocks to output (supply or demand shocks) and can act as substitutes in the 
case of inflation shocks or shocks affecting individual economic policy instruments. We 
contribute to this literature by providing comprehensive time series evidence on fiscal-
monetary-financial stability interactions. We do so in a flexible framework using infor-
mation from hundreds of macroeconomic time series, which significantly lowers the 
information bias. We rely mainly on Czech macroeconomic data, but our modelling 
framework can be extended to other economies.  
The theoretical foundations of policy and financial stability interactions can be found in 
Woodford (2011) and Carlstrom et al. (2010). Ueda and Valencia (2014) build a model 
based on a loss function with three elements: variations of output, inflation, and private 
sector leverage. They derive the following, rather intuitive equation:  
     1ln e et t t ty y          : , (1) 
which shows that ex-post leverage in the economy is given by surprises in inflation 
 et  , output  ety y , and credit growth t . Credit growth is in turn deter-
mined by regulatory measures and credit shocks. The relationship described in (1) sug-
gests that the increase of deviation from equilibrium of inflation  et   and output 
 ety y  lowers private sector leverage  . Assuming that the financial risk is posi-
tively correlated with the level of leverage, eq. (1) suggests that loose economic policies 
lower financial risks in the economy and therefore the risk of financial instability in the 
future. In this paper, we argue that the functioning of the economy might not be as 
straightforward as the theoretical models suggest, as the effect could go either way, i.e., 
may be positive or negative, and is significantly time-dependent.  
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Empirical methodology 
To study the fiscal-monetary-financial stability interactions, we use the factor-
augmented vector autoregression model (FAVAR) introduced in Bernanke et al. (2005). 
Our primary motivation for choosing the FAVAR model is to avoid the information bias 
when identifying the set of economic policy innovations.
7
 Also, we want to use the 
advantageous logic of VAR models, which are a theory–free way to “let the data speak” 
about causality questions. Last, one can find many types of autoregressive patterns in 
macroeconomic and financial time series, implying that the real economy does not con-
stitute a random entity. A VAR model accounts for these patterns and, for each variable 
entering the model, computes an equation explaining the variable’s evolution based on 
its own and other variables’ lagged values. 
In contrast to a simple VAR model, the FAVAR model includes unobserved low-
dimensional factors in the autoregression, reducing the information bias. The FAVAR 
model thus utilizes the advantages of a data rich environment, while remaining tractable 
in terms of the number of parameters to be estimated. We specify an 1M   vector of 
macroeconomic time series 
tY  and a 1K  vector of unobserved factors tF . We as-
sume that the joint dynamics of 
tF , tY   is given by the following equation: 
  1
1
.
t t
t
t t
F F
L
Y Y


   
     
   
, (2) 
where  L  is a lag polynomial and t  is an error term with zero mean and covari-
ance matrix Q. Equation (2) is a standard VAR model that can be interpreted as a re-
duced form of a linear rational-expectations model with both observed and unobserved 
variables. The unobserved variables make the model impossible to estimate; therefore, 
we assume that the additional informational time series 
tX  are linked to the unobserv-
able factors 
tF  and the observable factors tY  by: 
f y
t t t tX F Y e       , (3) 
where f  and y  are matrices of factor loadings and 
te  is a serially uncorrelated 
error term with a zero mean (innovation shock). Equation (3) captures the idea that both 
vectors 
tY   and tF  are pervasive forces that might drive the common dynamics of tX . 
This static representation of the dynamic factor model enables us to estimate the factors 
by principal components. As the static factors incorporate information from a large 
number of economic variables, the information set of the structural factor model is far 
greater than that of a standard VAR. Thus, it becomes unlikely that the information set 
                                                          
7   A situation in which the econometrician's information set is smaller than that of the economic 
agents. If this is the case, the relatively small number of variables in a small model may not be 
sufficient to properly identify shocks, which increases the risk of a biased estimate. For example, 
when trying to identify a monetary policy shock in a VAR model, the shock may actually not be 
truly exogenous, as it may also capture instances when the central bank endogenously reacts to 
changing inflation expectations. Forni and Gambetti (2010) demonstrate that non-fundamentals 
can account for the well-known VAR price puzzle and the delayed overshooting puzzle. Similar-
ly, Iwata (2013) discusses two fiscal policy puzzles and their possible explanations.   
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of economic agents will be superior to the information set employed by us. In our appli-
cation, the we assume that the vector of observable variables  
tY
 holds only our speci-
fied innovations, which are then assumed to have pervasive effect on the entire econo-
my. Note that any remaining time series from our vast dataset may be linked to the 
factors outside of the VAR model via factor loadings identified by the principal compo-
nent analysis. For details on the estimation procedure, please consult the Appendix C.
8
  
Data and identification scheme 
Our vector 
tX
 for factor extraction consists of a balanced panel of 140 quarterly time 
series representing the Czech economy and the rest of the world. They are drawn mainly 
from the Czech National Bank, Czech Statistical Office, and ECB databases. The data 
spans the period 2001:Q1 – 2016:Q1. Generally, it is not required to perform any ex 
ante categorization of data, but we can benefit from stacking data into sub-groups in 
accordance with the different classes of economic variables for the sake of the clarity of 
our computational process. The data sub-groups and corresponding variable counts are 
presented in Table 1 below. Note that prior to estimation, the data was transformed to 
assure stationarity of the time series using natural logarithms and first differences. By 
modelling the fiscal-monetary-financial stability interactions in a data rich environment, 
we control for real economy development, changes in fiscal and monetary policy, finan-
cial sector development, and external influences. 
We identify policy innovations using recursive ordering, placing unobserved factors 
before observed factors. The principal assumption is that unobserved factors do not 
respond to policy innovations within the first quarter. In order to identify policy innova-
tions, we divide our panel of variables into two groups: slow- and fast-moving variables. 
Blocks describing the external environment, real economy, fiscal variables, and prices 
are classed as slow-moving (in the order given in Table 1). A slow-moving variable is 
one that is largely predetermined in the current period and is assumed not to respond 
instantaneously to the specified shocks. The rest of the blocks are classed as fast-
moving variables, which are assumed to be highly sensitive to contemporaneous eco-
nomic news or shocks. In case of a fiscal shock, all fiscal variables are classed as fast-
moving as in Lagana and Sgro (2011). Note that the variables from which we extract the 
innovations are always ordered last in the covariance matrix (and treated as a factor on 
their own). This means that we assume each of the given innovations to affect our latent 
factors with a lag of one quarter. Since we want to avoid a shortage of degrees of free-
dom, we prefer to use a smaller model with lower number of lags. The standard infor-
mation criteria tests suggest three lags, but using more sensitive exclusion-based Gen-
eral-to-Specific approach, we find that two lags are sufficient. Therefore, our baseline 
FAVAR model contains two lags. Nevertheless, we check for the robustness of our 
results later. 
                                                          
8 The FAVAR modelling framework is used in many economic applications, see for instance 
Forni and Gambetti (2010), Eickmeier and Hofmann (2013), Aastveit (2013) or Hodula and Pfeif-
er (2018). 
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Table 1 Sub-groups in the dataset 
Data Sub-Groups Slow/Fast Moving Number of Variables 
External environment (S) 12 
Real economy (S) 32 
Labour market (S) 17 
Government (S) 12 
Prices and price expectations (S) 20 
Interest rates and credit (F) 29 
Financial sector (F) 12 
Exchange rates (F) 6 
Note: The Appendix lists the time series included in these sub-groups. Sub-groups highlighted in 
bold contain variables used as the source of an identified shock. Such variables are never includ-
ed in the dataset from which we extract the factors.   
We consider three types of economic policy shocks: monetary and fiscal policy expan-
sion and systemic risk materialization. The main policy tool of the CNB is a two-week 
repo rate. However, because the repo rate does not change continuously but only as an 
outcome of CNB Board of Governors meetings, we use the inter-bank rate to proxy for 
the CNB’s key monetary policy rate; similar to how it is done in the CNB’s own fore-
casting system. Hence, we identify an expansionary monetary policy shock as a de-
crease in PRIBOR 3M. From the financial stability standpoint, an interest rate drop 
increases the economy’s leverage and boosts the risk appetite of economic subjects, and 
therefore may threaten financial stability. The main fiscal policy variables are govern-
ment revenue from taxes and total government expenditure, either of which may be used 
as a source of the innovations. However, using government revenue from taxes as a 
source variable increases the risk of endogeneity, since government revenue growth is 
associated with business cycle expansion. On the basis of these shortcomings, we identi-
fy an expansionary fiscal policy shock as an increase in total government expenditure.
9
 
Last but not least, we consider the impact of systemic risk materialization as part of 
financial cycle development. We draw this information from the non-performing loans 
(NPL) ratio time series. During financial stress, the NPL ratio grows because of an 
increase in the absolute level of non-performing loans and a decrease in newly-granted 
loans. Hence, the systemic risk materialization shock is identified as an increase in the 
NPL ratio.  
We conduct a number of checks to verify the robustness of our results. First, we use 
alternative variables and time frames during the identification of shocks. In case of 
monetary policy expansion, we check the robustness of results with respect to the 
CNB’s exchange rate commitment, which started in November 2013, and the model 
with data ending in 2012Q1.
10
 By cutting the sample, we also address the fact that the 
                                                          
9 Additionally, while changes in asset prices may influence government revenues, they are much 
less likely to affect government spending.  
10 For more details on the exchange rate commitment (and recent exit) please consult the CNB 
website at https://www.cnb.cz/en/monetary_policy/exit_exchange_rate_commit/index.html 
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CNB hit the zero lower bound in 2013Q1 when it decreased its main two-week repo rate 
to 0.05%. For fiscal policy expansion, we attempt to simulate a decrease in government 
revenues from taxes as an alternative measure. In addition, we also consider a different 
setting for the systemic risk materialization shock and use information from housing 
price development as a source of the shock. None of the above-mentioned changes had 
significant impact on the sign of estimated parameters, and therefore we claim the re-
sults to be robust in this manner. The results of these exercises are available upon re-
quest. Second, we test whether our results are affected by changing the number of fac-
tors that enter the FAVAR model. In particular, we try estimating the model with 5 and 
7 factors. Most of the estimated median IRFs from the models with 5 and 7 factors lie 
inside the 90% confidence interval of the FAVAR model with 3 factors. The only dif-
ference is a slightly slower reaction of the variables to the monetary policy shock in the 
case of models with larger number of factors. Third, we use an alternative identification 
strategy for fiscal and monetary policy shocks. Results are robust to the use of other 
plausible orderings of the variables in the FAVARs: We tried ordering the external 
environment group of variables last, and we also changed the source of the innovation 
from PRIBOR 3M to the average lending rate to check if the results are dependent on 
the maturity of loans. Further robustness checks include an increased number of lags in 
the FAVAR model (up to 4 lags); they provide results that are both qualitatively and 
quantitatively similar.  
Empirical results 
The effects of the specified innovations are presented in Figures 1−4 using impulse 
response functions (IRFs) over a time window of four years (16 quarters). The IRFs 
show the responses of the selected variables to an identified shock and the shock’s 
propagation over time. We plot the median responses to show the central tendency of 
the estimated response functions. The responses were normalized to represent 100 basis 
points’ (bps) worth of shocks. Accurate confidence intervals are calculated via a boot-
strap procedure as in Kilian (1998), which accounts for the uncertainty in the factor 
estimation. One of the main advantages of the FAVAR approach is that IRFs can be 
constructed for any variable in the information set. Due to space constraints, we only 
report those that are relevant to the causal relations investigated. 
We first estimate the effects of positive surprises in monetary and fiscal policy on a set 
of variables related to the financial sector. Specifically, we are interested in determining 
the responses of variables describing financial cycle development (housing prices, loans 
to the private non-financial sector, NPL ratio), the prudential behaviour of banks (loss 
provisions, risk-weighted assets), and bank resilience (capital surplus). The choice of 
variables describing financial cycle development is primarily motivated by Babecky et 
al. (2012), Reinhart and Rogoff (2013), and Laeven and Valencia (2010, 2013), who 
studied the early warning indicators of financial crises and determined that property 
prices, interest rates on loans, and volume of lending to the private sector are good in-
formation sources. We complement these variables with the official financial cycle 
index, computed and published by the Czech National Bank (see Plasil et al., 2015, for 
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details on index construction).
11
 Details of financial cycle evolution in the Czech Re-
public are available in Appendix B.  
Transmission of fiscal and monetary policy-like shocks 
First, to see if the model captures relevant theoretical responses of the main macroeco-
nomic variables to fiscal and monetary policy-like shocks, we show the response of real 
GDP, unemployment rate, inflation, and real effective exchange rate (Figure 1). Follow-
ing monetary policy expansion, real economic activity eventually increases, which man-
ifests itself in higher real GDP growth and a lower rate of unemployment. The annual-
ized consumer price index exhibits a lagged increase after 3 to 4 quarters, which is in 
line with the targeting horizon of the CNB and largely coincides with previous empiri-
cal evidence (Borys et al., 2009). We document a minor price puzzle right after the 
shock, which may be linked to inflation undershooting in the post-crisis period. This 
explanation is supported by the fact that when using only the data up to 2012Q1 for 
estimation, this small price puzzle disappears.  
Turning to the effects of fiscal expansion, we report a gradual increase in real GDP 
growth and a decrease in the rate of unemployment. However, while the immediate 
median reaction of GDP is positive, it gradually turns negative, suggesting only a mar-
ginal reaction which may be associated with a partial crowding-out effect. This was also 
found to be true in Franta (2012) and Ambrisko et al. (2015), who estimate fiscal policy 
transmission using Czech data as well. Like us, they also report an increased inflation 
rate following increased government expenditures, and a rather ambiguous response of 
the exchange rate.  
Figure 1 Fiscal and monetary policy transmission into the real economy 
 
Notes: Median impulse responses are reported with 90% probability bands. The y-axis measures 
the strength of the variable’s response in percentage points; the x-axis is in quarters after the 
shock. All variables except the rate of unemployment enter the model as annualized percentage 
growth.  
                                                          
11 Note that we do not use the credit-to-GDP gap in any form to proxy for financial cycle devel-
opment. Numerous studies have shown that it may yield incorrect information (Edge and Meisen-
zahl, 2011; Hamilton, 2017, to name a few). Gersl and Seidler (2011) have further shown that the 
credit-to-GDP gap is not an appropriate measure for converging economies, such as the Czech 
Republic. 
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Second, we turn our attention to the responses of the financial sector-related set of vari-
ables (Figure 2). Following a relaxation of monetary policy, credit activity increases 
proportionally, which is not surprising. An increase in risk-weighted assets is the more 
likely outcome of an increased amount of loans to the private sector, but the results may 
also suggest a change in banks’ portfolio structure towards riskier investments (a 
search-for-yield motive). Highly surprising, however, are the significant disproportions 
between short and medium term responses of residential property prices and the finan-
cial cycle index. These two variables are directly linked to financial cycle development. 
While they decrease mildly at first (i.e., a more stable financial sector), they eventually 
increase 4 to 5 quarters after the original shock, peaking at 7 to 8 quarters. We provide 
the following economic interpretation for the result:  
In the short term, before economic agents are able to adjust their balance sheets, lower 
interest rates benefit financial system stability. First, by boosting aggregate demand, a 
monetary expansion increases household earnings and firms’ profitability. Lower inter-
est rates also decrease the debt service ratio in the short term; i.e., we document a posi-
tive impact of monetary policy on effective lending rates, which dominates a negative 
effect on debt-to-income ratios (in line with the conclusions of Hoffman and Peersman, 
2017). This is also evident from the response of the NPL ratio, which declines right 
after the shock. In the medium term however, the effects of monetary expansion are 
likely to reverse, as we observe a gradual increase in residential property prices, the 
financial cycle index, the debt service ratio, and non-performing loans after 3 to 7 quar-
ters from the shock’s introduction. This is a natural outcome of the already-boosted 
demand for credit, but it also shows that monetary policy might eventually promote 
risk-taking behaviour in both households and banks. From a financial stability perspec-
tive, following a relaxation of monetary policy the loss provisions and capital surplus 
decrease, which indicates a decrease in banks’ prudential behaviour and resilience to 
potential stressful events. 
As concerns fiscal policy, its measures are also transmitted to the financial sector and 
affect our set of variables. Credit activity increases after the shock, suggesting that even 
fiscal expansion may increase the demand for credit, especially if economic agents 
believe that the fiscal expansion is of a relatively permanent nature and not merely a 
temporary measure. We do not find evidence supporting any kind of Ricardian behav-
iour among economic subjects. Judging from the increased residential property prices, 
we argue that the credit channel of fiscal policy operates through the housing market. 
The rise in credit may lead to a surge in demand for housing and contribute to the up-
ward response of residential property prices. In this manner, fiscal expansion also tem-
porarily improves economic agents’ balance sheets because of the increasing value of 
collateral. This effect is borne out by the NPL ratio response, which decreases at impact. 
Our results generally confirm the views presented in Agnello and Sousa (2013), who 
show that government size matters in the estimation of the fiscal policy–asset price 
relationship, and that countries small in size (such as the Czech Republic) are more 
likely to avoid a credit shortage generated by increased government deficits.  
Volume 18, Issue 3, 2018 
207 
Figure 2 Fiscal and monetary policy pass-through into the financial sector 
 
 
Notes: Median impulse responses are reported with 90% probability bands. The y-axis measures 
the strength of the variable’s response in percentage points; the x-axis is quarters after the shock. 
All variables except the financial cycle index enter the model as annualized percentage growth. 
Table 2 Cumulative impulse responses for fiscal and monetary policy shock 
 Monetary expansion Fiscal expansion 
period 1 − 4 5 - 8 9 – 12 1 − 4 5 - 8 9 - 12 
Housing price index -0.165 2.061 2.189 1.218 1.006 
n. s. 
Financial cycle index -0.494 1.366 2.609 0.635 1.175 
Non-performing loans -2.951 -0.75 0.848 -0.638 0.092 
Debt service ratio -1.918 -1.671 1-437 -0.223 1.111 
Loans to private sector 2.189 0.354 0.268 1.314 0.426 0.111 
Risk-weighted assets 1.963 0.689 -0.426 -0.447 0.116 0.084 
Notes: Cumulative responses for the first (1st to 4th quarter), second (5th to 8th quarter), and 
third (9th to 12th quarter) year after the shock; n. s. denotes response is not significant in the 
given period.  
Table 2 provides a comparison of fiscal and monetary policy effects on financial varia-
bles related to financial stability. At first glance, we identify some key time-variations 
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in the responses. While the monetary expansion seems to lower the risk of financial 
instability in the short term (within the first year), it promotes an increase in credit dy-
namics and might subsequently (if kept accommodative long enough) lower financial 
resilience. Fiscal expansion, on the other hand, influences credit dynamics and the relat-
ed set of variables in the short term and then fades out. These results point towards an 
unfavourable policy mix: monetary expansion coupled with subsequent fiscal expansion. 
Let us consider one hypothetical scenario in the economy:
12
 The central bank relaxes its 
monetary policy and decreases interest rates, which should translate into increased eco-
nomic activity and temporarily lower the risk of financial instability. This could create 
sufficient fiscal space for the government to support the monetary expansion by raising 
its spending. The already mounting effects of monetary expansion are now multiplied 
by the effects of fiscal expansion on asset prices and risk appetite. Under these condi-
tions, macroprudential policy measures might not be sufficient to contain systemic risk 
build‒ups.  
Frait and Malovana (2017) recently confirmed that accommodative monetary policy 
contributes to a build-up of financial vulnerabilities. This means that a conflict may 
arise between monetary policy and macroprudential policy. Beyond this, we argue that 
monetary policy expansion might be further boosted by a subsequent fiscal expansion, 
and the present time-series evidence supports this claim. In light of our findings, macro-
prudential policy cannot view fiscal policy as Ricardian (passive), but must consider it 
similarly to how it views monetary policy. This obviously makes the coordination prob-
lem even more complex.  
What are the effects of systemic risk materialization?  
It is also relevant to ask to what extent the fiscal and monetary policy setting should 
take into account financial cycle development. To answer this question completely, we 
need to take into consideration not only the contribution of monetary and fiscal policies 
to systemic risk accumulation, but also the impact of systemic risk materialization on 
key macroeconomic variables (such as prices, output, fiscal sustainability, etc.) and 
financial sector variables. During this exercise, we simulate an increase in the NPL ratio, 
an indicator which generally increases during periods of financial stress due to the in-
crease in the number of bankruptcies and delinquencies (numerator effect) and decrease 
in the dynamics of new loans granted (denominator effect). We henceforth refer to this 
innovation as a “systemic risk materialization shock”.  
Figure 3 shows that the materialization of systemic risk affects economic activity and 
variables associated with fiscal and monetary policy. It causes a substantial drop in 
economic activity, lasting over a year. Typical symptoms are declining real GDP, rising 
unemployment, and falling prices. The documented currency depreciation might be an 
outcome of two mechanisms: first, we might be picking up some of the effects of cur-
rency interventions by the CNB (from 2015 to 2017); and second, in response to defla-
tionary pressures, the CNB significantly lowered its main policy rates, which would, 
under the uncovered interest rate parity rule, lower the REER as well.   
                                                          
12 In fact, the analysis of fiscal-monetary policy interaction presented in Figure 1D in the Appen-
dix shows that this scenario is plausible. 
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Figure 3 Systemic risk materialization and real economic activity 
 
 
Notes: Median impulse responses are reported with 90% probability bands. The y-axis measures 
the strength of the variable’s response in percentage points; the x-axis is in quarters after the 
shock. All variables except the rate of unemployment and PRIBOR 3M enter the model as annual-
ized percentage growth. 
Further, systemic risk materialization may also manifest itself in the economy’s fiscal 
position and sovereign risk, as it influences both government revenues and expenditures 
and debt service costs. This stems from decreased economic activity, which lowers 
revenues from taxes. Regarding government expenditure, we may expect it to increase 
in the form of government support packages reacting to the ailing economy. Subse-
quently, because of the worsened primary budgetary balance and decreased GDP, we 
document a substantial increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio. Overall, we find some evi-
dence of a non-negligible deterioration in public finances following systemic risk mate-
rialization. In general, we confirm the significantly negative effect of systemic risk 
materialization and its rather quick transmission into the real economy and to variables 
associated with fiscal and monetary policy.  
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Figure 4 Systemic risk materialization, policy responses and the financial sector 
 
 
Notes: Median impulse responses are reported with 90% probability bands. The y-axis measures 
the strength of the variable’s response in percentage points; the x-axis is in quarters after the 
shock. All variables enter the model as annualized percentage growth. 
Figure 4 gives indications as to the causes behind the systemic risk materialization in 
the financial sector: With the decreased ability of economic agents to repay their loans, 
we document a rather sharp decline in both credit dynamics and housing prices. This 
adverse market situation affects mainly commercial banks, which collectively become 
much more risk-averse, changing their portfolios in favor of less risky assets (in practice, 
this would manifest as increased exposure to the government and central bank). This is 
a simple signaling strategy wherein banks strive to present themselves as stable to de-
crease the cost of additional capital, which, due to the crisis, generally increases. In spite 
of decreasing risk-weighted assets (outcome of the above-mentioned portfolio cleans-
ing), capital surplus significantly decreases. This might also be achieved by simply 
increasing the capital requirements. Materialization of systemic risk increases loss pro-
visions and risk costs, which represent a significant component of the interest rate on 
loans. Growth of interest rates on loans to the private sector increases the debt service 
ratio and might lead to further deterioration of the loan portfolio. 
Conclusions 
We explore situations in which fiscal, monetary, and financial stability may interact, 
and contribute to the discussion about the related policies’ coordination and potential 
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conflicts. We highlight the need to take into consideration both fiscal and monetary 
policy, as they may both affect asset prices and credit dynamics and contribute to sys-
temic risk accumulation and therefore influence financial cycle amplitude. For this 
purpose, we construct a FAVAR model to capture the policy interplay in a data-rich 
environment. The FAVAR model helps ensure that the estimated impulse responses are 
invariant with respect to extensions of the information set – an issue that often plagues 
impulse response results.  
The presented model enables us to identify several patterns. First, loose economic poli-
cies have a positive impact on financial stability in the short term, but this effect may 
reverse in the medium term. In greater detail, we find that fiscal and monetary policy-
like shocks impact the economy and financial sector differently. While fiscal expansion 
influences credit dynamics and the related set of financial sector variables in the short 
term and then quickly fades out, monetary expansion seems to benefit financial stability 
at first, but its effects turn negative in the medium term. This somewhat complicates the 
answers to the first two research questions presented in the introduction: For the first 
question, loose economic policies might indeed benefit financial stability in the short 
term, but (if kept accommodative long enough) they will eventually work in the oppo-
site direction, towards instability. For the second, yes, fiscal and monetary policy shocks 
impact the financial sector differently. We highlight the need to consider the full policy 
mix (fiscal and monetary policy effects) when formulating appropriate policy measures. 
Regarding our third research question, we find that financial imbalances (systemic risk 
materialization) cause losses in output, damage public finances, and trigger deflationary 
pressures. Furthermore, systemic risk materialization leads to increases in the debt ser-
vice ratio and might lead to further deterioration of the loan portfolio.  
Overall, our results confirm the need to discuss and coordinate changes in economic 
policy to avoid potential conflict situations and surprises in the market. Going beyond 
existing research, we also provide time-series evidence showing that macroprudential 
policy cannot view fiscal policy as Ricardian (passive), but must consider it similarly to 
how it views monetary policy. Further, our finding that both fiscal and monetary policy 
may be transmitted into the financial sector and influence the risk-taking behavior of 
economic agents provides support for countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy. 
Therefore, we make several policy recommendations that may decrease the procyclical 
character of economic policy and mitigate possible conflict situations at low implemen-
tation cost:  
In the fiscal policy area, we believe implementing a fiscal rule to restrict the procyclical 
character of public finances and stabilize government debt over the long term would be 
beneficial. However, as the Bank for International Settlements (2016) states, it is im-
portant to augment the fiscal rule with a proper automatic stabilization scheme, and 
apply it ex ante when certain economic conditions are met. Further, Borio et al. (2013) 
recommend including information about financial cycle development into the potential 
product and output gap estimation. Another possibility for mitigating the unwanted 
fiscal policy procyclicality associated with systemic risk build-up would be to partially 
adjust the taxation system in order to limit the growth of certain types of credit. Given 
the procyclical development of residential property prices and loans to the private sector, 
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it would be beneficial to limit mortgage tax relief (see Andrews et al., 2011).
13
 The 
European Commission (2015) has encouraged Member States to ensure that tax systems 
do not encourage household debt. Lombardi et al. (2017) give evidence of the negative 
impact of high household indebtedness on GDP growth over the long term. There are 
possibilities to limit the impact of sovereign risk on the banking sector. The Czech Na-
tional Bank was among the first to implement methods for public finance stress testing 
with special capital requirements on banks with higher sovereign default risk on gov-
ernment bonds (CNB, 2016). 
The impact of monetary policy actions on financial stability may be partially mitigated 
by incorporating residential property prices in the targeted consumer price index or by 
using a broader index (Hampl and Havranek, 2017, describe CPIH on the case of the 
Czech Republic) as a supplementary indicator for monetary policy decisions. There are 
also other, more controversial propositions for mitigating the procyclical character of 
monetary policy. Borio (2016) suggests the use of an augmented Taylor rule, in which 
the monetary authority should respond not only to the inflation gap but also to some 
defined financial stability gap, and state that a monetary policy rule that takes financial 
developments into account could help reduce the financial cycle, leading to higher out-
put in the long run. 
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Appendix 
A. Data description 
Table 1. Data description and sources  
Group No. Series description Unit Source TC S/F 
R
ea
l e
co
no
m
y 
1 Industrial production index, industry total 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
2 Industrial production index, mining and quarrying 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
3 Industrial production index, manufacturing 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
4 Industrial production index, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
5 Sales from industrial activity, industry total 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
6 Sales from industrial activity, mining and quarrying 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
7 Sales from industrial activity, manufacturing 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
8 Sales from industrial activity, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning  2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
9 Direct export sales, industry total 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
10 Direct export sales, mining and quarrying 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
11 Direct export sales, manufacturing 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
12 Domestic sales, industry total 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
13 Domestic sales, mining and quarrying 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
14 Domestic sales, manufacturing 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
15 Domestic sales, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
16 New industrial orders, industry total 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
17 Non-domestic new orders 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
18 Domestic new orders 2010=100 CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
19 Construction production index 2010=100 CSO - Construction  2* S 
20 House price index, buildings 2010=100 CSO - Construction  2* S 
21 House price index, civil engineering works 2010=100 CSO - Construction  2* S 
22 Retail trade receipts 2010=100 CNB, ARAD 2* S 
23 Gross domestic product, market prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
24 GDP deflator 2010=100 CNB, ARAD 2* S 
25 Final consumption expenditures, total, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
26 Final consumption expenditures, households, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
27 Final consumption expenditures, government, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
28 Final consumption expenditures, non-profit organisations, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
29 Gross capital formation, total, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
30 Export, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
31 Import, current prices Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
32 Real gross domestic income  Millions CZK CSO - GDP 2* S 
33 Debt service ratios for the private non-financial sector % BIS database 2 S 
La
bo
ur
 m
ar
ke
t 
34 Industry total, average number of persons employed (ANPE) no. of persons CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
35 Industry, mining and quarrying, ANPE no. of persons CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
36 Industry, manufacturing, ANPE no. of persons CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
37 Industry, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, ANPE no. of persons CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
38 Industry total, average gross nominal wage (AGNW) CZK per person CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
39 Industry, mining and quarrying, AGNW CZK per person CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
40 Industry, manufacturing, AGNW CZK per person CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
41 Industry, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply, AAGNWNPE CZK per person CSO -Industry, energy 2* S 
42 Construction total, average number of persons employed (ANPE) no. of persons CSO - Construction  2* S 
43 Construction total, average gross nominal wage (AGNW) CZK per person CSO - Construction  2* S 
44 Employees total, hours worked thousand hours CSO - GDP 2* S 
45 Employees, Agriculture, forestry and fishing thousand hours CSO - GDP 2* S 
46 Employees, Manufacturing, mining and quarrying and other industry thousand hours CSO - GDP 2* S 
47 Employees, Construction thousand hours CSO - GDP 2* S 
48 Employees, Trade, transportation, accommodation and food service thousand hours CSO - GDP 2* S 
49 Employees, Public administration, education, health and social work thousand hours CSO - GDP 2* S 
50 General unemployment rate of the aged 15 to 64 years % CNB, ARAD 1* S 
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51 Job Vacancies thousand CNB, ARAD 2* S 
52 Unplaced job seekers thousand CNB, ARAD 2* S 
G
ov
er
nm
en
t 
53 Government debt, total Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
54 Debt securities, total Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
55 Debt securities, short-term Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
56 Debt securities, long-term Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
57 Government loans, total Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
58 Government loans, short-term Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
59 Government loans, long-term Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
60 Debt interests payed Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
61 Government expenditures, total Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
62 Government revenue, total Millions CZK CSO - Government 2* S 
P
ric
es
 a
nd
 p
ric
e 
ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 
63 Consumer Price Index (CPI), total 2015 = 100 CNB, ARAD 2* S 
64 CPI, food and non-alcoholic beverages 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
65 CPI, alcoholic beverages, tobacco 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
66 CPI, clothing and footwear 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
67 CPI, housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
68 CPI, furnishings, household equipment, routine maintenance 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
69 CPI, health 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
70 CPI, transport 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
71 CPI, communications 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
72 CPI, recreation and culture 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
73 CPI, education 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
74 CPI, restaurants and hotels 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
75 CPI, miscellaneous goods and services 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
76 Industrial Producer Prices (IPP), total 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
77 IPP, mining and quarrying 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
78 IPP, manufacturing 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
79 IPP, electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
80 IPP, water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation  2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
81 Market services price indices in the business sphere, total 2015 = 100 CSO - Prices 2* S 
82 Inflation expectations of non-financial corporations and companies % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
83 Financial market inflation expectations % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
In
te
re
st
 r
at
es
 a
nd
 c
re
di
ts
 
84 Repo rate - 2 weeks % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
85 PRIBOR 3M % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
86 PRIBOR 1Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
87 Government bond yield 2Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
88 Government bond yield 5Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
89 Government bond yield 10Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
90 Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households total % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
91 Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households, up to 1Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
92 Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households, up to 5Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
93 Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households, over 5Y % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
94 
Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households consumer credit 
- total % 
CNB, ARAD 
1 F 
95 
Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households for house 
purchase - total % 
CNB, ARAD 
1 F 
96 
Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, households other loans - 
total % 
CNB, ARAD 
1 F 
97 Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, non-financial corporations % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
98 
Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, non-financial corporations, 
up to 1Y % 
CNB, ARAD 
1 F 
99 
Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, non-financial corporations, 
up to 5Y % 
CNB, ARAD 
1 F 
100 
Bank interest rates on CZK-denominated loans, non-financial corporations, 
over 5Y % 
CNB, ARAD 
1 F 
101 Monetary base, monthly average Billions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
102 Monetary aggregate M1 Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
103 Monetary aggregate M2 Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
104 Loans to residents and non-residents - MFIs Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
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105 Loans to non-financial corporations - MFIs Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
106 Loans to financial corporations - MFIs Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
107 Loans to government Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
108 Loans to households Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
109 Loans, short-term (up to 1Y) Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
110 Loans, medium-term (up to 5Y) Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
111 Loans, long-term (over 5Y) Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
112 Consumption loans, total Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
113 Mortgages, total Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
114 Other loans, total Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
F
in
an
ci
al
 s
ec
to
r 
115 Capital adequacy ratio, total % CNB - non-public data 1 F 
116 Leverage ratio, total % CNB - non-public data 1 F 
117 Risk-weighted assets to total assets % CNB - non-public data 1 F 
118 Non-performing loans to total assets % CNB - non-public data 1 F 
119 Loans to total assets (LTA) % CNB - non-public data 1 F 
120 Spread (difference between 10Y gov. bonds yield and PRIBOR 3M) % own calculation 1 F 
121 Composite indicator of sovereign stress 0-1 interval ECB 1 F 
122 Financial cycle indicator 0-1 interval CNB - non-public data 1 F 
123 Index PX value PSE 2 F 
124 MFI total assets Millions CZK CNB - ARAD 2 F 
125 House price index 2010 = 100 CSO - Prices 2 F 
126 Banks provisioning value CNB - non-public data 2 F 
127 House price gap - CNB calculations value CNB - non-public data 1 F 
128 Overvaluation of commercial property prices - CNB calculations value CNB - non-public data 1 F 
129 Capital surplus Millions CZK CNB - non-public data 2 F 
130 Insurance companies and pension funds Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
131 Money market funds Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
132 Investment funds Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
133 Other financial intermediaries (financial vehicle corporations) Millions CZK CNB, ARAD 2 F 
E
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
s 
134 Real effective exchange rate 2015=100 CNB, ARAD 2 F 
135 Nominal exchange rate CZK/EUR, monthly average value CNB, ARAD 2 F 
136 Nominal exchange rate CZK/GBP, monthly average value CNB, ARAD 2 F 
137 Nominal exchange rate CZK/USD, monthly average value CNB, ARAD 2 F 
138 Nominal exchange rate CZK/JPY, monthly average value CNB, ARAD 2 F 
139 Nominal effective exchange rate 2015=100 CNB, ARAD 2 F 
E
xt
er
na
l e
nv
iro
nm
en
t 
140 Government bond yield 2Y - eurozone % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
141 Government bond yield 5Y - eurozone % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
142 Government bond yield 10Y - eurozone % CNB, ARAD 1 F 
143 Yield spreads on risky private sector bonds value CNB - non-public data 2 F 
144 Crude oil, Brendt, $/bbl, current Europe USD/barrel EIA 2 F 
145 Crude oil, Brendt, $/bbl, current US USD/barrel EIA 2 F 
146 Crude Oil Production, US fields thousand barrels EIA 2 F 
147 Composite indicator of systemic stress, eurozone index 0-1 ECB 1 F 
148 EURIBOR 3M % ECB 1 F 
149 GDP, chain index volumes, Eurozone (changing composition) 2010 = 100 Eurostat 2 F 
150 DAX index value Datastream 2 S 
151 Industrial production index, total Germany 2005 = 100 Eurostat, ipp_st_m 2 S 
152 Ifo - Business Climate Index, Germany 2005 = 100 CESifo 2 S 
153 All Commodity Price Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
154 Non-Fuel Price Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
155 Food and Beverage Price Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
156 Industrial Inputs Price Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
157 Agricultural Raw Materials Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
158 Metals Price Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
159 Fuel (Energy) Index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
160 Crude Oil (petroleum), Price index 2005 = 100 IMF 2 S 
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The table 1 shows all time-series incorporated in the analysis. Used abbreviations stands 
for: CSO = Czech Statistical Office, CNB – Czech National Bank database ARAD, IMF 
– International Monetary Fund database, ECB – European Central Bank Statistical Data 
Warehouse. The transformation codes (TC) are: 1 – no transformation; 2 – first differ-
ence of logarithm. An asterisk, ‘*’, next to the transformation code number denotes a 
seasonally adjusted variable using CENSUS X13. S/F ranks variables as slow or fast 
moving in the estimation. 
B. Financial cycle in the Czech Republic 
Figure 1B. Financial cycle and its phases.  
 
The figure shows the evolution of risk-weighted assets and non-performing loans in the 
Czech Republic over the time period from 2001 to 2016. The data are compared with 
the evolution of an official financial cycle index which is described in Plašil et al. 
(2014). The variables are in percentage change over the previous year. For the sake of 
clarity, the variables were z-score normalized. It shows that the pre-crisis development 
can be well associated with the accumulating of risks as evident from the risk-weighted 
assets build-ups. On the contrary, the post-crisis period is characterized by increasing 
NPLs, which indicates an increase in the amount of failures and delinquencies in the 
economy.  
C. Details of the FAVAR Estimation Procedure 
The model is estimated in five steps. First, all factor models require an initial step prior 
the estimation to determine the optimal number of factors used. One possibility is to use 
the Bai-Ng information criterion to determine the number of factors present in the mac-
roeconomic data vector 
tX . However, as shown by Tuzcuoglu and Hoke (2016), dif-
ferent time spans might lead to different numbers of factors. Also, the Bai-Ng criterion 
does not solve the issue of how many factors we should include in the VAR model itself. 
We recommend using the following General-to-Specific approach: (i) estimate the mod-
-3
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Risk-weighted assets Non-performing loans Financial cycle index
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el with a large number of factors; (ii) check the correlations of every single variable 
with the estimated factors; (iii) eliminate those factors which do not yield a statistically 
significant correlation with any group of variables in 
tX
; (iv) check that the simplified 
model remains congruent. 
In our application, we have used between 3 and 7 factors; the model with 3 latent fac-
tors provides the highest explanatory power and its results are therefore reported in the 
main text. In Table 1C, we check the correlations of sub-groups of variables with the 
estimated factors. Visual inspection helps us to determine the actual interpretation of 
these factors. The first factor loads on real economic variables, coupled with prices. The 
positive correlations accumulated in second factor correspond at most to credit and 
financial sector related variables. The third factor explains the external development, 
which is of great importance to the Czech economy. The remaining fourth and fifth 
factors are mostly insignificant in terms of correlations, which only justifies estimating 
the FAVAR model with just three latent factors. 
Table 1C: Sub-groups in the Dataset 
Data Sub-groups F1 F2 F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 
Real economy 0.464 0.148 -0.191 -0.070 -0.015 -0.035 0.101 
Labour market 0.289 0.151 0.110 -0.096 0.072 0.056 -0.081 
Government 0.233 -0.546 -0.108 -0.016 0.031 0.168 -0.170 
Prices 0.415 -0.102 0.087 0.083 0.199 0.068 0.011 
Interest rates and credits -0.107 0.313 0.197 0.063 -0.054 -0.083 0.015 
Financial sector 0.006 0.240 0.188 0.108 -0.069 0.081 0.043 
Exchange rates -0.153 -0.031 -0.015 -0.014 0.025 0.134 0.034 
External environment 0.128 0.136 0.413 0.210 -0.004 0.091 0.071 
Factor 1 1       
Factor 2 0.068 1      
Factor 3 0.006 -0.061 1     
Factor 4 0.031 0.057 -0.056 1    
Factor 5 0.023 -0.013 -0.011 0.002 1   
Factor 6 0.019 -0.008 -0.019 0.009 0.006 1  
Factor 7 -0.020 0.084 -0.028 0.010 0.018 0.074 1 
Notes: Table shows average correlations between sub-groups of variables with five estimated 
factors. Correlations that are significantly different from zero are highlighted in bold. Note that 
we estimate three independent models using 3, 5 and 7 factors.   
Second, we follow Stock and Watson (2002) and divide our panel of variables into two 
groups: slow- and fast-moving variables. Then, we use a two-step principal components 
approach, which is a nonparametric way of estimating the space spanned by the com-
mon components  ,t t tC F Y    in (2). The common components tC  are estimated 
using the first K+M principal components of 
tX . Note that we impose the factor re-
striction (as in Bernanke et al., 2005), which identifies the factors against any rotations. 
tF  is obtained as the part of the space covered by tC   that is not covered by tY . In our 
application, we assume that the vector 
tY  holds only the specified innovations. As such, 
the 
tY  may be treated as a separate factor with pervasive effect on the rest of the econ-
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omy (
tX
). In other words, for the two-step approach to work, our identification scheme 
requires first controlling for the part of 
tC
  that correspond to the innovation in 
tY
. The 
following regression is estimated in the process: S
t F t Y t tC b F b Y e     where 
S
tF  
are slow-moving factors estimated from the slow-moving variables and 
t t Y tF C b Y    . 
Third, the loading matrixes are fitted into a VAR framework, estimated by the standard 
method, with 
tF
 being replaced by 
tF . Fourth, the VAR is estimated and identified 
recursively using the ordering specified in the main text. Fifth, we construct confidence 
bands of the impulse response functions using a bootstrap-after-bootstrap technique 
proposed by Kilian (1998).  
D. Fiscal-monetary policy interactions.  
Figure 1D. Propagation of fiscal and monetary policy shocks and their mutual 
interaction 
Fiscal and monetary policy innovations Reponses of the main policy variables 
  
Notes: Median impulse responses are taken from the FAVAR model with 3 factors. The y-axis 
measures the strength of variables response in percentages. 
The figure provides only a rudimentary comparison of the identified fiscal and monetary 
policy innovations and their propagation over a time horizon of four years, as well as a 
quick look at their mutual interactions. It shows that the fiscal expansion is identified as 
rather short-lived. The shock lasts four quarters before returning to the long-term equi-
librium. On the contrary, the monetary expansion reveals a longer-lasting impact on the 
studied system. Turning to the mutual fiscal-monetary interactions, the time series evi-
dence suggests that, in short, increasing government expenditures (fiscal expansion) 
causes monetary policy tightening, while releasing monetary policy allows fiscal policy 
to expand as well. This is quite logical and expected given both economic policies' pri-
mary targets. The Figure also shows that fiscal expansion raises inflation, so any central 
bank under the inflation-targeting regime is obliged to prevent such inflationary pres-
sures and increase its policy rates in response. On the other hand, monetary expansion 
decreases the debt service costs of outstanding government debt. Fiscal policy is thus 
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free to support the monetary expansion by raising its expenditures. Similar policy be-
haviour was documented in Mountford and Uhlig (2009) using US data, Haug et al. 
(2013) for Poland and Dungey and Fry (2009) for New Zealand. 
